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Abstract: This paper draws on stem cell research and financial derivatives as 
two case studies to analyse the role of scientific knowledge and technology in 
the development of the Chinese knowledge economy. The findings suggest 
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the institutionalisation of knowledge within these sectors. Scientific-based 
knowledge and professional know-how are on the one hand perceived as prime 
drivers of China’s development, yet they on the other hand remain subordinate 
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1 Introduction 
According to a most recent survey conducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (2009), China is considered the world’s most favoured destination for 
R&D investment. Further, harmonisation with global standards and the importation of 
global knowledge into Chinese institutions are considered important for China both to 
further sustain its competitiveness and to realise potential investment returns (Auerwald 
and Branscomb, 2008; Pilat et al., 2009). Centring on stem cell research and financial 
derivatives, this paper examines the role knowledge plays in the development of the 
Chinese knowledge economy. These are two different sectors that have both received 
increasing attentiveness in China for their implications on global competitiveness. They 
provide complementary insights into the evolvement of an increasingly knowledge 
intensive Chinese economy. 
Finance is a service industry while stem cell research may be best described as 
applied medical research, which with the potential of stem cell-based remedies forms  
a production industry. Following consecutive economic reforms in the early 1980s and 
the mid-1990s, China’s financial market has much expanded (Neftci and Ménager-Xu, 
2007). Currently, there are more than 1700 companies listed on the stock exchanges in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen. Some of the largest IPOs have taken place in China. To further 
the efficiency of the already expanding markets, derivatives markets have also been 
created. Commodity futures exchanges have existed in Shanghai, Dalian and Zhengzhou 
since the early 1990s. In recent years, interbank markets (OTC) for derivatives, such as 
FX forwards and swaps, have also been created. Meanwhile, stem cells have come to be 
seen as central to the development of regenerative medicine. Stem cell-related patents by 
Chinese firms or scientists have enjoyed an approximately 30% annual growth rate in the 
last decade (Salter et al., 2006). Although still at its early stage, experimental stem cell 
therapies have already contributed to the treatment of a variety of diseases in China, such 
as cardiac repair, graft-versus-host disease, limb ischemia, liver disease, neural repair and 
idiopathic pulmonary arterial hypertension (Liao and Zhao, 2008). 
While the two industrial sectors are different, several features tie them together.  
Not only are they both knowledge intensive sectors, but more importantly, both have 
undergone an institutionalisation process, where formal and codified organisational 
routines, technologies, regimes and practices – predominantly science-based – have been 
implemented. As such, the Chinese stem cell industry and the derivatives sector both 
have, to some extent, been ‘Westernised’ as they have adopted professional conventions 
(such as peer-review procedures, ethical standards, accounting standards and use of 
derivatives pricing models) mostly initiated or invented in the West. This paper focuses 
on these institutionalisation processes which are simultaneously knowledge transfers. 
Yet, as is demonstrated in this paper, these institutionalisation processes have not 
been penetrative. Although Chinese stakeholders at all levels have been most keen on 
engaging with global exchanges and learning from international community, China’s 
building of a knowledge economy is not a simple importation of knowledge with a 
subsequent ‘isomorphic’ assimilation process (Powell and Dimaggio, 1991). Rather, data 
suggest there has been a decoupling between knowledge receptions and its applications at 
certain phases of the knowledge economy. Scientific information and professional know-
how are both perceived as a prime force to drive China’s development and as subordinate 
to existing administrative infrastructure. 
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By identifying this dual reality of knowledge utilisation in the Chinese setting, this 
paper contributes both to the explicit understanding of China’s institutionalisation 
process and to a more general comprehension of institutional hybridity which many 
ongoing social transformations may share with the one described here. 
2 Methodology and structure 
Data used in this paper are based on interviews with key Chinese stakeholders and 
practitioners. For the case study on stem cell research, 38 Chinese scientists were 
interviewed in six cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Hangzhou and Changsha) 
during the period of 2006 and 2009. This research employs a grounded theory approach 
(Charmaz, 2006), in which data collection and social science literature reviews were 
repeatedly carried out at different stages. Through detailed and repeated analysis of the 
data, the transcripts were then indexed into themes by identifying reoccurring concepts 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990). The interviews were focused on the formation of stem cell 
research practices in China.  
The case study on financial derivatives draws on 30 transcribed interviews which 
were indexed as described above (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). The research on derivatives 
markets was from the outset focusing on derivatives traders’ perceptions of risk in the 
context of Chinese financial markets. As such, the interviews sought traders’ accounts of 
their work with the aim of analysing the meanings (Kvale, 1996) which were attributed 
the market environment in which the traders work. 
The subsequent sections are organised as follows: First, the role knowledge plays in 
the creation and development of stem cell and financial derivatives industries will be 
examined in turn. Second, the common themes emerging from the two cases are discussed 
in relation to new institutional organisational theory. Finally, a conclusion is presented. 
2.1 Case one: stem cell research and the two-tier funding mechanisms 
China “has made biomedical science a central plan in its bid to become a dominant force 
in the global knowledge economy” (Salter and Qiu, 2009, p.4). In particular, a series of 
funding incentives (MOE, 1998; State Council, 2003; MOST, 2007) have been focusing 
on attracting overseas-returns Chinese as a means to transform “‘brain drain’ into a ‘brain 
circulation’” (OECD, 2007, p.29; Schaaper, 2009). The number of stem cell-related 
projects funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) has increased 
with nine projects in 1999. 
Yet, despite the attentiveness in promoting the domestic knowledge economy by 
keeping up with global research, it remains a major challenge how scientific expertise 
would be accommodated by and interact with regulatory frameworks. Although China 
has continuously taken new science and technology (S&T) initiatives since 1985, the 
“S&T administration system has not implemented any major changes for more than  
20 years” (Zhong and Yang, 2007, p.324). Regulatory decisions and social resources are 
still mainly channelled through governmental administrative branches (see Huang et al., 
2004; Ratchford and Blanpied, 2008; Song, 2008). Major funding sources can be traced 
back to a few national agencies, such as the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST, 
2007), the NSFC, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the Ministry of Education 
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(MOE, 1998). Alternative funding, such as venture capital, business investment or  
social charities, remains limited [Liu and White, 2001; UK Stem Cell Initiative (UKSCI), 
2005]. In other words, current Chinese R&D still relies on a much centralised regulatory 
infrastructure and depends upon governmental funding. Consequently, when global 
scientific information and know-how are imported into Chinese research communities, 
they are not automatically assimilated into institutional decision-making. Rather, as will 
be demonstrated in the following paragraphs, the reception of new knowledge prompts a 
two-tier expertise-dependence mechanism. At one level, decisions on scientific investments 
are said to be made by “relying on experts and developing democracy to select best 
proposals” (Zhu and Gong, 2008, p.298). Some national agencies, such as NSFC, have 
extended its peer-review panel to the international scientific community, as a means to 
ensure that China’s progress keeps pace with the latest global development (Zhu and 
Gong, 2008). Yet at another level, data suggest that the rigour of influence professional 
knowledge has on China’s scientific investment decreases as the level of research 
programmes go higher up (from local to national). Nationally speaking, “top-down, 
nationally mandated programs’ that ‘seem to favour hierarchical guidelines” (Nichols, 
2008, p.440) still play a dominant role in the allocation of resource in the bio-industry.  
This two-tier expertise-dependence mechanism was suggested by many interviewees 
during the authors’ fieldwork. One such example was from a professor in Zhejiang 
University, who explained the funding process as follows: 
The funding system in China is like this: the smaller the grant, the more 
stringent the reviewing process. The bigger the grant, the less rigorous the 
review is. If it is a billion-RMB project, there is virtually no reviewing process. 
Who the grant-holder will be has already been decided internally by funding 
bodies before applications are sent for ‘peer-review’ (Scientist 04). 
Scientist 04 described a situation in which, at one level, modern reviewing procedures 
were more or less in place, while at another level, with the increasing size of grants,  
there was a decreasing weight given to open competition. When it comes to ‘100 million-
RMB projects’ (roughly equal to 10 million Euros), peer review became only a matter of 
formality: ‘Who the grant-holder will be has already been decided internally’. Such 
descriptions echo Cao and Suttmeier’s (2001) study on Chinese scientific communities. 
This study pointed out that at the grass-root layer, where small grants or so-called 
‘mianshang’ projects (Cao and Suttmeier, 2001, p.965) were given out, funding decisions 
were based on open peer review and scientific merit. Meanwhile on the top layer, which 
consists of ‘key (zhongdian) and major (zhongda) programmes’, actual executive power 
still mostly lies in centralised decision-making rather than being based on ‘the intrinsic 
merits of a proposal’. Techno-bureaucrats, such as yuanshi (Academicians of CAS), were 
entitled to “inappropriate influence in recommending the types of projects which should 
be included in the guidelines for proposals” (Cao and Suttmeier, 2001, p.966). 
It is useful to highlight here that both in Cao and Suttmeier’s (2001) study and in 
Scientist 04’s account, there was not a complete ignorance of scientific peer review. 
Quite on the contrary, both the 2001 study and Scientist 04’s account support the fact that 
peer review had been quite ‘stringent[ly]’ carried out in circumstances where it was 
(allowed to be) applied, namely distributing small grants. The point is, however, that 
professional knowledge was given different weight in the funding of ‘mianshang’ 
projects and ‘key’ projects. 
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Yet the role of professional knowledge in determining resource distribution at the 
upper level (major programmes) and the bottom level (small scale/local programmes) is 
not clear-cut and is being increasingly challenged. One such example is from a professor 
in Sun Yat-sen University: 
Many funding schemes internally decide who to fund. Including the  
863 Program and the 973 Program [administered by MOST], they are the same. 
Those decision boards are very clear about who these grants will be given to, 
mostly to their affiliated institutions…. I once applied for a scheme sponsored 
by a ministerial department. The feedback from the review board was all good. 
But this department has its own affiliated institutions to feed. So we didn’t get 
the grant at first. But [comparing to the team internally-decided by the funding 
body], our proposal was too good. It was too obvious a favouritism. So we 
made our appeal, then we shared the grant with the [internally-decided] team 
(Scientist 04). 
There are three points in Scientist 04’s statement that are worth highlighting. First, it 
exhibits a tension between scientific expertise and administrative convention. This 
respondent’s application was initially rejected, not on the basis of its research value but 
on the basis of his institutional affiliation. Yet this ministerial department did respond to 
Scientist 04 with the good comments from peer review. But his application was turned 
down anyway. In other words, there was no obvious attempt of a ‘cover-up’ from the 
ministry for its allocation of scientific resources on a basis other than peer review. This 
leads to a second point. That is, it seems that Chinese regulators recognised professional 
assessments as both important and inferior to ministerial decisions. Third, and most 
interestingly, there seems to be an emerging limit to this traditional managerial discretion. 
When institutional interference was ‘too obvious’, appeal based on scientific argument 
can exert a certain leverage and alter governmental decisions. In the case of Scientist 04, 
his appeal was a partial success, as he shared with the internally decided team the grant 
that could have been all his. 
A similar example is the experience of Scientist 16, whose application on stem cell-
related tissue-engineering was originally rejected by NSFC. On a private occasion,  
one regional grant administrator told him that although people were impressed by his 
research capabilities and academic profile, the board thought he was too young (Scientist 
16 was in his 30s) to be granted major funding. Thus, they internally decided to reject 
Scientist 16’s application and granted the funding on a similar topic to a less outstanding 
scientist in his 50s. The irony of this case was that, after being denied a national grant, 
Scientist 16 applied for an alternative local governmental funding and received, albeit a 
much smaller, grant. Soon his team raced ahead of the parallel research lead by the older 
scientist. By the time the author revisited his lab two years later, the administrators, who 
once thought Scientist 16 should ‘wait for his turn’ in handling a major grant, had already 
tried to invite him to be incorporated into the bigger project. The reason, Scientist 16 
specified, was that it would cause (political) embarrassment if the ‘chosen team’ with 
major national funding had been exceeded by a ‘rejected team’ supported by local 
funding. 
The dual reality confronted by scientific expertise in China can be recapitulated as 
such: at the upper level resource distribution, professional knowledge (such as national/ 
international peer review) is recognised as important but subordinate to administrative 
conventions. In the above case, the NSFC panel acknowledged the research potential of 
Scientist 16’s proposal. But internal preference overrode the scientific evaluation. Just as 
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described by a 2006 Science article, at least in terms of national major funding, the 
Chinese scientific community still resembles ‘a milieu of unhealthy relationships’ in 
which “success often depends more on how well a scientist cultivates support from grant 
managers and politicians than on the quality of research” (Xin et al., 2006, p.1464). At 
the lower level, namely ‘mianshang’ projects or local scientific schemes, professional 
opinions seem to exert more influence over the course of research development. Scientist 
16’s project, denied of NSFC funding by internal decision but supported locally, is one 
such example.  
Cases such as Scientist 16 who was later ‘invited back’ to the major project and 
Scientist 04’s successful appeal seem to suggest that there is an emerging negotiable area 
over top-down decisions on the ‘chosen teams’. Yet, such cases require persistence from 
grass-roots stakeholders and do not come without temporary impediments to scientific 
progress (such as insufficient financial support or research delay). Instead of ‘directly’ 
shaping China’s innovation progress, in most cases, there seems to be a ‘detour’ before 
scientific knowledge can influence research directions.  
2.2 Case two: finance and the dual reality of professional expertise 
The development of the financial sector in China mirrors closely the general economic 
reforms in the country. After reforms launched in 1978, the big four Chinese banks were 
(re) created, that is the Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Construction 
Bank of China and the Industrial Bank of China. In the 1980s, smaller commercial banks 
were being established. In the early 1990s, stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
were established together with commodity futures markets (see above). Since the mid 
1990s, a host of commercial banks has been established. The big four Chinese banks 
have been reformed which, above all, means that loans to SOEs have been written off 
and the Basel frameworks have been implemented. This process started as early as in 
1994, when smaller policy banks were established with the aim of reliving the big  
four banks of this function. The People’s Bank of China acts as the national bank in 
China. Although many SOEs have been privatised, the Chinese government, as well as 
local governments, continues to own big stakes in now private companies. Structurally 
speaking, there is, even today, a marked degree of government control. 
Governmental control is visible also in terms of financial regulation and the general 
architecture of the financial markets. Foreign investors are monitored through a Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme, while domestic investors can only  
invest abroad through the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) scheme. The 
exchange rate of RMB remains under government control. The RMB interest rate has not 
been liberalised either. An intermediary step towards this has been the creation of the 
SHIBOR index rate (roughly similar in method of calculation to LIBOR). Although 
current market cap of China’s listed companies exceeds 50% of China’s annual GPD, 
there are a range of regulatory measures which results in the government still being able 
to exercise corporate control. Shares are divided into two types (A and B), with one being 
opened to domestic investors and the other to foreign investors. Although this distinction 
has been blurred over time, shares continue to be divided into subcategories with only 
one category being traded freely on the exchanges. Many of the other shares are owned 
by the government or governmental investment vehicles. 
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In spite of the very special traits of the Chinese economic architecture, common 
policy statements assert that a sound and efficient financial system is seen as essential  
for creating the investment flows necessary for economic growth, channelling in foreign 
direct investment, managing financial and economic risk associated with high volume of 
export and monitoring both incoming and out-flowing foreign direct investment. It is on 
this background that China’s government gave a green light for the creation of interbank 
financial derivatives markets. The process primarily took place in 2004–2006.  
The products which are traded in the interbank market are relatively simple derivatives. 
They include FX forwards and swaps, RMB/foreign exchange currency swaps, interest 
rate swaps, interest rate forwards and bond forwards. Trading on the interbank market,  
as is the case for all securities trades, is regulated by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), a spin-off from the PBC. The regulatory framework is quite 
similar to the sector-based system in the USA (Huang, 2010). 
These developments are of course only possible through the employment of Western 
expertise, both in regard to the design of market infrastructure (trading platforms, clearing, 
regulation, etc.) and derivative products creation and asset pricing. This expertise has 
been transferred into China in different ways. First, the transfer has taken place through 
the stream of Chinese students who have attended business schools and universities in the 
USA and Europe (Jongsthapongpanth and Bagchi-Sen, 2007). Many of these have then 
returned directly to work in Chinese banks or the Chinese government. Others have first 
had a stint working in Wall Street or the city of London before returning. Second, 
Western banks actively strive to disseminate knowledge in the Chinese market place. At 
least one of the big Western banks operating on a large scale in the interbank derivatives 
market conducts regular seminars for smaller Chinese banks on asset pricing and  
risks assessment. Many of the Chinese banks only promote staff to middle management 
positions if they have completed 3–6 months post experience education courses in 
finance. And finally, the implementation of Basel II, although this in some cases has lead 
to the creation of Potemkin villages rather than real reform, has without question helped 
to spread knowledge about financial theory and risk management in Chinese banks. 
At the same time, however, the development of China’s financial institutions seems 
to follow a common trajectory of (centrally planned) knowledge and technology transfer 
in that the temporal order of the institutional and regulatory development seems wrong. 
This often creates an impression of window dressing, when, for example, a regulatory 
measure is created before there are activities to be regulated. ‘Attempting to build the 
third story of a building before the second story’ was an expression dryly used by one 
interviewed trader. Another trader puts it as follows: 
The most traditional way for Chinese banks to make money is to get deposits 
from clients at a very low rate and let the loans climb at a high rate so that  
the interest rate difference is huge. But nowadays the central bank is trying  
to change the institution. They want to free the interest market, but the 
government always does things in a step-by-step fashion. And before they free 
the interest market they announced they will establish a forward market. The 
order is wrong (laughs) (Trader 18). 
While further liberation of the financial sector may seem as a dominant theme in  
the current portrait of China’s emerging market efficiency or maturity, the other side of 
the story is that the Chinese government continues to exert strong influence over the  
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financial markets. This happens both through regulatory schemes such as QFII and QDII 
and through strong, yet often informal, control over the big four Chinese banks (Bank of 
China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial bank of China and China 
Agricultural Bank). These four banks are the main market makers in the interbank markets. 
According to the interviewees, they exert considerable influence over the market, not 
least because they are regarded by other market participants as having privileged access 
to information. Hence, instead of making their own decisions on basis of acquired 
knowledge, other market makers tend to follow the lead of the four banks. 
They[the smaller market makers] will think that… it is the practice, no, I’ll say 
the convention, that the Bank of China or the Agricultural Bank… are all 
government controlled. We view that when some new policy comes out, they 
will get instructions first. So that is why all the other market makers will 
follow. Because they will think that their [the big four] behavior may instructs 
something – they [the smaller market makers] just don’t want to miss 
something, new policy or something (Trader 09). 
Chinese economic policy is often described with the term ‘gradualism’. The rationale is 
that unlike the sudden transition from state to market economies in the former eastern 
European Block, China has made a slow and careful transition (Hsu, 2005; Redding and 
Witt, 2007). However, it is far from clear if China’s approach will lead to the creation  
of market institutions in forms that are familiar to the West. Indeed, gradualism also 
refers to a situation where there are ongoing discussions about reforms versus tradition 
within the government and party (Naughton, 2008). More importantly, China’s gradual 
transition has been a process in which the government, albeit not so much the central as 
the local government, has become a prime motor for new economic development. In spite 
of the privatisation of many state-owned companies, the Chinese government has taken 
on new and extensive economic roles in various forms of partnerships with private 
entrepreneurs in such a way that there is great competition between local branches of the 
government which again has created a much higher efficiency than in the time of the 
SOEs (Walder, 1995). The result is that “in China, the government is the entrepreneur” 
(Khanna, 2009, p.37). 
Of course the continuing dominant role of the state does not necessarily mean that a 
slow process towards a Westernisation of financial institutions will happen. Yet, a 
Western and former high-level financial consultant to the People’s Bank of China clearly 
stated that the Chinese government, in his experience, was wary of being too embedded 
in Western financial systems due to the belief that this would lead to the creation of 
Western institutional structures and make China dependent upon Western expertise. 
There seems to be general consensus in the industry that the Chinese regulators do not 
intend to create neither institutions nor regulatory schemes similar to the West as this is 
seen as a pathway to volatile markets beyond state control. Not surprisingly, the financial 
turmoil in 2007–2008 is seen as having fortified this perception. 
This paper is not to speculate whether the development of the Chinese markets is on 
course towards matching generic Western markets structures or whether they will maintain 
their distinct characteristics. Rather, we note that interviewees commonly describe how 
they, in their daily practices, negotiate a dual reality. While Western theories and pricing 
models are commonly recognised by Chinese stakeholders as essential knowledge  
in developing a robust financial sector, their functions are often negotiated and even 
discounted in actual market operations. One example could be the following observations 
from a trader: 
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[There is] no correct yield curve because the interest rate market hasn’t been 
liberalised. The PBOC still controls the rates for the client and lending. But for 
interbank there are no restrictions because the interbank price will be decided 
by the real supply and demand which means that we have different markets... 
That is why it’s difficult to get a correct and objective...market level…what  
the real market level is for that interest rate. Even now we have SHIBOR, but 
that actually doesn’t affect the market value. When the SHIBOR was just 
announced in 2006, we could see that […]for the very short term, the prices 
were correct which mean that you could deal with other parties. But for other 
tenures…all the other like 3 months, 6 months, we have really dealt with all the 
counter parties and you have to put in margins (Trader 22). 
3 Discussion  
The role of knowledge in China’s knowledge economy can be summarised into the 
following points. First, the importation and accumulation of global knowledge seems  
to be attributed a value in its own right. Even in cases where new knowledge does not 
exert obvious influence over stakeholders’ decisions or course of actions, bringing in 
international practice and expertise is considered a necessity. In both the case of stem cell 
research and financial sectors, Western training and familiarity with novel know-how are 
considered a prerequisite for individuals to acquire a job or secure a grant. What is more 
important, despite the fact that major research grants are still determined by internal 
administrative decisions, peer reviews with national and international expertise inputs 
have been employed as standard procedures by funding agencies. Similarly, although 
markets are still largely dominated by top-down directives from the central bank, 
financial derivatives models and other forms of technical financial knowledge are being 
used, and an index such as SHIBOR has been created. In other words, even in the 
absence of clear administrative functions assigned to newly imported practices, there has 
been an institutionalisation of formal structures based on science in parallel to existing 
decision-making conventions. This is not to deny the utility of professional expertise and 
tools. But it indicates that importance attached to knowledge must be explained through 
other things than utility only. 
Second, as demonstrated by the development of both sectors, the motive for 
implementing new knowledge and standards may not necessarily be the improvement of 
productive efficiency but rather the expansion of resources for administrative control. In 
the research setting, global professional expertise is incorporated not as the foundation 
for better funding strategies but as subordinate to administrative conventions. In the 
financial setting, Chinese regulators hesitate in creating new institutions or regulatory 
schemes on basis of Western know-how, as this is seen as a pathway to volatile markets 
beyond state control. In this sense, we argue that the role of knowledge is perceived less 
as a helping hand in transforming institutional norms into more effective ones and more 
as a resource for enhancing institutional capabilities for comparison and control. This 
finding corresponds with previous empirical studies which suggest that the importation  
of global knowledge is about increasing institutional governance options rather than 
replacing existing ones (Pilat et al., 2009). 
This highlights that a correlation between knowledge transfer and institutional change 
may not be straightforwardly assumed. Instead, as suggested by the Chinese experience, 
hybrids between economic and regulatory schemes may emerge. The dual reality 
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confronted by the Chinese knowledge economy may not be unique, but may be indicative 
of the dynamic between knowledge and institutions in emerging economies’ path to 
global competitiveness more generally. 
The existence of such dual reality can be explained as a process of coupling and 
decoupling. Powell and Dimaggio (1991) have pointed out that modern organisations or 
field of practices often are established through an isomorphic process, in which scripts of 
rules and specifications are institutionalised and subsequently disseminated, imitated and 
adapted by other social actors. Through this process, different rationalised conventions 
gain a symbolic (i.e. persuasive) power, which enable them to be perceived by certain 
groups as a means to promote their interests. Among all forms of such ‘scripts’, 
scientifically acquired knowledge (such as research data and financial models), with its 
abstract and theoretical nature, is arguably among those most easily diffused. Such 
scientific scripts transcend the details of local reality and hence are applicable to many 
specific situations and contexts (Strang and Meyer, 1993). Moreover, the authority of 
science makes scientifically grounded practices and scripts attractive in situations 
characterised by high uncertainty. 
But organisational practices are often decoupled from these institutionalised scripts 
and conventions. In fact, as has also been pointed out by new institutional theorists, “the 
more inspiring and universal the values and claims at the institutional level are, the more 
bounding and decoupling at the practical level are likely to result” (Drori et al., 2003, 
p.15). As written, such decoupling processes are clearly exhibited in China’s stem cell 
research and financial sectors in particular in regard to funding decisions and market 
behaviour. 
From a top-down perspective, it is arguably so that in the Chinese setting hierarchical 
centres in existing institutions are comparably more influential in filtering, selecting and 
incorporating knowledge than what is usual. As Strang and Meyer (1993, p.495) have 
noted, sciences and scientific professions are communities that are ‘relatively central, 
prestigious, influential’ and they thus play a key role in theorising and promoting  
the diffusion of global knowledge. Yet, cross-border transference of knowledge requires 
support from existing social authorities as well – something which seems particularly 
important in China. As Meyer and his colleagues’ later study indicates, ‘pick-and-paste 
strategies’ are often used in which “only some components of the global model of 
science are [deemed, authors’ addition] transferable or that only some components of the 
global model are appropriate for the local context” (Drori et al., 2003, p.213). Although 
the Chinese individuals interviewed (scientists or bankers) are either Western trained or 
highly familiarised with global practices, it is high raking Chinese officials that ‘pick  
(not copy!)-and-paste’ how the range of expertise should be incorporated into their 
management norms. In other words, the embodiment of global knowledge at the 
individual level is not automatically assimilated and presented at the institutional level. 
Quite on the contrary, Chinese institutions have shown reservation, even some resistance, 
in institutional adjustments in accordance to international know-how. This is the reason 
for the tension described above. And it shows that there is not simply an isomorphic 
assimilation process going on, but a more complex process where selected elements are 
institutionalised. 
Reversely, it is clear that, from the bottom-up perspective, individual practitioners do 
not possess the same leverage in influencing professional norms as authorities at the 
upper-end of the command chain. Yet, the institutional need to acquire global knowledge 
(so as to further stabilise administrative control) does empower professionals to some 
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extend to influence institutional actions. Although peer review and financial derivatives 
have not constituted a central role in China’s institutional administrations, they nonetheless 
have become an important reference. In some cases, as demonstrated by this paper, grass-
root practitioners can use this relevant knowledge to influence, revise or even overturn 
executive decisions. Similar dynamics among grass-root actors and institutions in 
acquisition of new knowledge can be found in Jang’s study on the global diffusion  
of ministries of science and technology. Jang (2003) pointed out that institutional  
change is often initiated by political pressure or economic competitions, but successful 
transformations ultimately depend on “nonstate actors such as the sciences and 
professions, who advice [nation-states] on what to do” and “how they should behave” 
(Jang, 2003, p.123). In other words, the non-penetration of knowledge transfer or the  
decoupling of policy from organisational practice in the Chinese context may not 
necessarily be the limits of globalisation, but may indicate a prolonged process of new 
institutional balance in the making. 
4 Conclusion 
Many previous studies have elaborated on how knowledge can be better transferred to 
improve local efficiency and productivity (see Fritsch and Kauffeld-Monz, 2008; Luo 
and Hassan, 2009; Loof and Andersson, 2010). However, despite the fact that knowledge 
is a key element in modernisation, and scientifically based technologies and conventions 
may enhance productivity, the role of scientific knowledge in the development is far 
from straightforward. Data from two sectors (stem cell research and financial derivatives) 
have suggested a dual reality in China’s institutionalisation of scientific knowledge, 
technologies and conventions. 
On the one hand, both the Chinese stem cell sector and the derivatives industry have 
undergone an institutionalisation of formal organisational practices which in both cases  
is grounded on the authority of science. Among these are – in the former case, the 
adaptation of scientific conventions; and in the latter, the employment of ‘scientific’ or 
objective forms of risk management. This finding is in line with Strang and Meyer’s 
(1993) theoretical analysis that a key incentive for institutions to acquire global know-
how is to translate diverse activities in different societies into ‘comparable’ entities and 
to “theorise the universal and beneficial relevance of new and otherwise alien social 
materials” (Strang and Meyer, 1993, p.506). The symbolic authority of science lends 
power to such a process. Yet, on the other hand, current regulatory settings in both  
the R&D and finance sectors reproduce existing hierarchical structures in which 
developments are led by top-down directives, relying on centralised resource control. The 
diffusion of professional knowledge and global practices in China’s building of its 
knowledge economy is shaped by and interacts with pre-existing political structures and 
interests. 
By examining two examples of a new institutional balance in the making, this 
research not only provides empirical evidence of how knowledge is identified, processed 
and utilised in the Chinese context. Findings of this paper also extend and enrich the 
understanding of the isomorphic processes as well as decoupling proposed by new 
institutional theory. It specifies three features of how the coupling and decoupling 
processes are perceived and operated on the ground. First, accumulation of global 
knowledge is attributed a value in its own right, decoupled from utility, simply because 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    The dual reality of the Chinese knowledge economy 171    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
the scientific basis of the knowledge adds credence to the institutional field, in which it is 
implemented disregarding any eventual utility. In this way, institutionalisation of formal 
structures based on science often precedes a recognition of its administrative functions. 
Second, the motivation for importing global knowledge is linked and perhaps motivated 
by attempts to maintain existing institutional control rather than general enhancement  
of organisational efficiency. We find that institutionalisation of scientific knowledge 
rarely happens in ways which radically change existing power structures (that it may 
plant the seeds of change is a different question, but we would be cautious even of that 
assumption). Finally, the just mentioned reproduction of existing power structures and 
the identified dual reality more generally should not be interpreted as an institutional 
rejection of scientific knowledge but rather be seen as an example of how the Chinese 
authorities carefully – and so far rather successfully – have integrated various economic 
sectors in the global economy without losing political control. We suggest, in other 
words, that the dual reality we have identified in our case studies is part of a grander 
hybridity of government control and market economy. 
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